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CAN THE RISK OF RELAPSE, IN AN ADDICTION CONTEXT,
CONSTITUTE A CURRENT DISABILITY FOR PURPOSES OF
LONG-TERM DISABILITY PLANS?
Andrew Cassady*

I. INTRODUCTION
Ninety-hour weeks, high stress environments, and abuse of the drug
Fentanyl had become the norm for Dr. Julie Colby, until 2004, when a
colleague found her unconscious on a table in the hospital where she
worked
Dr. Colby was an anesthesiologist in Newburyport,
Massachusetts, and she became addicted to the same drug that she used
to treat patients in her practice.2 After this episode, Dr. Colby took a
leave of absence and entered inpatient substance-abuse treatment in
Atlanta, where she was diagnosed with, among other things, opioid
dependence. 3 She remained at the treatment center for about four
months, after which time she remained under regular medical
supervision on an outpatient basis.4 Although she stopped using the
drug, her medical license was revoked.
When Dr. Colby's dependence on Fentanyl initially came to light, her
employer offered a group employee benefit plan underwritten and
administered by Union Security Insurance Company & Management
This plan was governed by the Employee
Company (USIC).6
Retirement Income Security Act of 1974 (ERISA or Act),7 and it
included long-term disability (LTD) benefits. USIC paid Dr. Colby
these benefits while she was at the treatment center, but it refused to pay
them once she left.9 USIC reasoned that although she remained under a
doctor's care and feared a relapse, a "risk of relapse" did not amount to
a current disability, and thus, she was not entitled to any LTD benefits. 10
* Associate Member, 2012-2013 Universityof CincinnatiLaw Review.
1. Colby v. Union Sec. Ins. Co., 705 F.3d 58, 60 (1st Cir. 2013).
2. Id. Fentanyl is an opioid commonly used in the practice of anesthesiology. Id. It is a very
potent morphine-like analgesic, and is typically administered to treat severe pain in patients before and
after surgery. Fentanyl, NATIONAL INSTITUTE ON DRUG ABUSE: THE SCIENCE OF DRUG ABUSE AND
ADDICTION, http://www.drugabuse.gov/drugs-abuse/fentanyl (last visited Jan. 8, 2014).
3. Colby, 705 F.3d at 60. She was also diagnosed with a dysthymic disorder, obsessivecompulsive disorder, and degenerative disc disease. Id.
4. Id.
5. Id.
6. Id.
7. 29 U.S.C. §§ 1001-1461 (2012).
8. Colby, 705 F.3d at 60.
9. Id.
10. Id.
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Dr. Colby exhausted her administrative appeals under ERISA" and
eventually brought suit against USIC in federal court.12 The district
court deemed USIC's termination of benefits unreasonable,1 3 but after
the case was remanded,14 USIC continued to resist payin any benefits
beyond the date that Dr. Colby left the treatment center. Once again,
Dr. Colby exhausted her administrative appeals, after which point the
district court reopened her case and awarded her LTD benefits for the
remainder of the time period available under the plan.16 USIC appealed
to the First Circuit, arguing that the categorical exclusion of risk of drug
abuse relapse was a reasonable interpretation of the plan.17
This Comment will address the issue of whether, in an addiction
context, a risk of relapse can constitute a current disability under
ERISA. The First Circuit in Colby" was only the second United States
appellate court to analyze this question, and its affirmative answer
created a split with the Fourth Circuit.' 9 Part II provides a brief
introduction into ERISA and then traces two competing lines of cases
dealing with the risk of relapse in both substance abuse and
nonsubstance abuse contexts. Part III details the opinions of the
Fourth and First21 Circuits. Part IV addresses the merits of both of
those decisions. Finally, Part V concludes that the risk of relapse of a
drug addiction can amount to a current disability and hypothesizes the
normative and positive effects of the First Circuit's decision in Colby.22
II. BACKGROUND

A. ERISA
ERISA is a federal statute that sets minimum standards for privatesector employee-benefit plans.23 ERISA was enacted to promote the
11. 29 U.S.C. §§ 1001-1461 (2012).
12. The Complaint actually named an array of defendants, but according to the First Circuit,
USIC was the real party in interest. Colby, 705 F.3d 58.
13. Colby v. Assurant Empl. Benefits, 603 F. Supp. 2d 223, 244 (D. Mass. 2009).
14. USIC had categorically excluded the risk of relapse as a basis for disability, and thus, the
district court instructed USIC to determine the likelihood of Dr. Colby's relapse before denying her
benefits. Colby, 705 F.3d at 61.
15. Id.
16. Id. The time period was 36 months.
17. Id.
18. Colby, 705 F.3d 58.
19. Stanford v. Cont'I Cas. Co., 514 F.3d 354 (4th Cir. 2008).
20. Stanford,514 F.3d 354.
21. Colby, 705 F.3d 58.
22. Id.
23. Frequently asked Questions about Pension Plans and ERISA, UNrrED STATES DEPARTMENT
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interests of employees and their beneficiaries in employee-benefit plans,
and to protect contractually defined benefits.24 Before the enactment of
ERISA in 1974, employees were forced to use state contract law in
order to recover their benefits, and they faced many jurisdictional and
procedural barriers in doing so.25 Thus, by passing ERISA, Congress
attempted to change this "unfavorable legal climate" for participants.26
The Act regulates the manner in which plans process benefit claims, and
most importantly, ensures that the plans afford a reasonable oportunity
ERISA
for a full and fair review of rulings adverse to the claimant.
imposes "higher-than-marketplace quality standards on insurers,"
mandating that plan administrators discharge their duties "solely in the
interests of the participants and the beneficiaries of the plan." 2 When
an ERISA plan grants the administrator discretionary authority to
determine eligibility, a denial decision will be reviewed by the courts
under an abuse of discretion standard.2 9
B. The CircuitSplit
While ERISA provides the statutory framework for the manner in
which insurance companies are supposed to process claims, it does not
set forth any requirements for what actually must be included in
disability plans; instead, the parties to the plan may contract as they see
fit. Whether a certain disability is covered thus often turns on the
language of the policy at issue, but the discussion by no means should
end there. This Part will briefly discuss several cases that have
addressed the question of whether a risk of relapse can constitute a
OF LABOR, http://www.dol.gov/ebsa/faqs/faqcompliancejpension.html (last visited Jan. 8, 2014). The
Act does not specify how much money a participant must be paid as a benefit. Id. ERISA requires
plans to regularly provide participants with information about the plan including, inter alia, plan
features and funding; sets minimum standards for participation, vesting, benefit accrual and funding;
requires accountability of plan fiduciaries; and allows participants to sue for benefits and breaches of
fiduciary duty. Id. The term "employee-benefit plan" can mean an employee benefit welfare plan, an
employee pension benefit plan, or both. Peter Schmidt, Part I. The Basics of ERISA as it Relates to
HealthPlans, in EMPLOYEE BENEFIT RESEARCH INSTITUTE ISSUE BRIEF NO. 167, at 3 (1995).
24. Black & Decker Disability Plan v. Nord, 538 U.S. 822, 830 (2003).
25. George Lee Flint, Jr., ERISA: Reformulating the Federal Common Law for Plan
Interpretation,32 SAN DIEGO L. REv. 955, 955 (1995); but cf Andrew Morrison Stumpff, Darkness at
Noon: Judicial Interpretation May Have Made Things Worse for Benefit Plan Participants Under
ERISA than had the Statute Never Been Enacted, 23 ST. THOMAS LAW REV. 101 (2011) (arguing that
judicial decisions under ERISA have been so anti-employee that it could now be said that participants in
employer-sponsored pension and health insurance plans would have been better off if the statute had
never been enacted).
26. Flint, supra note 25, at 958.
27. Black & Decker, 538 U.S. at 830-31.
28. 29 U.S.C. § 1104(a)(1) (2012).
29. Stanford v. Cont'l Cas. Co., 514 F.3d 354, 356 (4th Cir. 2008).
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current disability in the nonsubstance abuse context. Some of these
cases, and the reasoning employed therein, were cited by both the
Fourth and First31 Circuits. This Part will then progress to a
discussion of the same issue in the addiction context-the true focus of
this Comment-and will conclude by detailing the opinions of the only
two federal appellate courts to address the issue.
1. Nonsubstance Abuse Cases

Some courts have held that the risk of recurrence of a physical
condition is not sufficient to constitute a current disability. For instance,
in James v. Kansas City Chiefs Football Club, Inc., Long Term
DisabilityIns. Plan, the plaintiff was employed as an assistant coach for
the Kansas City Chiefs football team and was provided with a LTD
benefits plan.32 Following a bout with abdominal pain and nausea, the
plaintiff went to the emergency room, where he was diagnosed with
acute necrotizing pancreatitis. After he was released from the hospital
nearly a month later, his rehabilitation consisted of occupational and
speech therapy. 33 The defendant initially approved the plaintiffs claim
for LTD benefits, 34 but it later discovered that he had been coaching two
other football teams even though he maintained that he was not fit to
return to work.3 5 After obtaining several medical opinions, the
defendant retroactively denied the plaintiffs benefits, and although he
appealed, the plaintiff made no attempt to introduce additional medical
evidence to support his claim that he was disabled. 36 While the plaintiff

argued that the potential for episodes of pancreatitis would cause him to
miss work, the court noted, "[t]he Plan's definition of disability is in the
present tense; thus, benefits are only available for currently existing

30. Id.
31. Colby v. Union Sec. Ins. Co., 705 F.3d 58, 58 (1st Cir. 2013).
32. James v. Kansas City Chiefs Football Club, Inc., Long Term Disability Ins. Plan, No. 03003 1-CV-W-HFS, 2005 WL 1532945, at *1 (W.D. Mo. June 28, 2005). The plan was an employee
welfare benefit plan regulated by ERISA. Id.
33. Id at *2.
34. Id. at *3.
35. Id. at *4-5. The plaintiff had previously indicated a number of times that he had not yet
returned to work since becoming disabled. Id. at *3-4. The two other teams he was coaching were an
XFL team and an Arena Football 2 Team, both based out of Birmingham. Id. at *4.
36. Id. at *5. One doctor opined that the plaintiff was "physically capable of functioning in at
least a medium work level with accommodations during exacerbations of his chronic pancreatitis," id. at
*6, while another proffered, "[t]here is no reason or time frame during which Mr. James would not be
able to work in his occupation." Id. at *6-7. This latter opinion was given by a doctor who also
indicated that even though the plaintiff may have suffered from a few outbreaks, he was "fully
functional between acute attacks." Id. at *12.
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disabilities." 37
Because the plaintiff was not "presently and
continuously unable to perform the material duties" of his job, the mere
potential for future disability did not oblige the defendant to provide the
plaintiff with LTD benefits.
Conversely, other courts have found that the risk of recurrence of a
physical illness could amount to a current disability. In Hannagan v.
Piedmont Airlines, Inc., the plaintiff was a pilot who stopped working
when he was diagnosed with an allergy to unknown substances, which
caused him to have anaphylactic reactions. 39 After months of treatment,
the doctor indicated that medication had controlled the plaintiffs
conditions reasonably well but still advised him to carry an EpiPen at all
times in case of an anaphylactic reaction. The defendant denied the
plaintiffs application for LTD benefits, claiming that he was not
"disabled" under his plan because it was merely the revocation of the
plaintiffs license that precluded him from flying, not the underlying
disability.41 While first noting that the mere existence of a legal
disability "does not negate a health-related disability on which such
legal detriment is based,"42 the court asserted that plan administrators
may not deny benefits for future risk "when such a denial would put
claimants and/or others at risk unless the policy at issue expressly
denied coverage for such future risks."4 3 Thus, in assessing whether a
future risk of harm is in fact a disability, the plan administrator must
focus on the probability of its future occurrence.4 4 As the plan at issue
did not expressly exclude risk of future harm from coverage, the
defendant should not have denied the plaintiff's LTD benefits. 45
Likewise, in Saliamonas v. CNA, Inc., the court determined that the
plaintiff was disabled according to the terms of his employer's LTD
policy because work-related stress had the potential to aggravate his
37. Id. at *13.
38. Id.
39. Hannagan v. Piedmont Airlines, Inc., 2010 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 31472, at *2 (N.D.N.Y. Mar.
31, 2010). He was also diagnosed with obsessive-compulsive disorder and was treated with an
antidepressant. Id. Due to these diagnoses and treatment, the plaintiff failed his medical exam and had
his pilot's license suspended. Id. at *2-3.
40. Id. at *9-10.
41. Id at *3-4. Thus, the plaintiff filed suit pursuant to ERISA. Id.
42. Id at *12. By legal disability, the court was simply referring to the revocation of the
plaintiff's license. Id.
43. Id. at *13; accord Lasser v. Reliance Standard Life Ins. Co., 344 F.3d 381, 391 (3d Cir.
2003) (finding that the plaintiffs return to his stressful occupation would pose a substantial and
increased risk of heart attack and could thereby constitute a disability).
44. Id.
45. Id. at *14. Distinguishing its case from Stanford, the Hannagan court proffered that the
important consideration was not whether "a return to work would necessarily further aggravate his
condition; the disability arises from the grave risk that Plaintiff would pose to himself and those aboard
his plane if he did not take the prescribed medication." Id.
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permanent heart condition.4 6 The plaintiff in Saliamonas worked as a
programmer analyst for a hospital, from which he took medical leave,
citing that he could not work as a result of his coronary artery disease
and severe aortic insufficiency. 47 The defendant denied the plaintiffs
application for LTD benefits because the policy did not insure against
"future risks or possible loss."48 Observing that that the defendant's
interpretation suggested "that heart and artery disease can only rise to
the level of a disability if they are sure to cause a heart attack," the court
disagreed, asserting that this was "not a future condition, but rather a
present risk."4 9 The court concluded that to hold that "a permanent heart
condition that may be aggravated by stress can only rise to the level of a
disability when and if the insured suffers a heart attack" would be
unreasonable, and thus, the plaintiff should have received LTD
benefits.5 0
2. Substance Abuse Cases
More pertinent to this Comment are the cases that analyze the risk of
relapse question in a substance abuse context; although they arise in a
factually distinguishable context, many of the following cases draw on
the reasoning employed by the above opinions. Notably, all of these
courts, and even the insurance companies, acknowledge that the actual
drug addictions are covered under the plans as current disabilities.5 1
The only dispute is whether the risk of relapse into that addiction is
covered. In a case that was factually similar to Colby, a Georgia district
court held that the risk of a drug addiction relapse did not constitute a
current disability.52 The plaintiff in that case was an anesthesiologist,
46. Saliamonas v. CNA, Inc., 127 F. Supp. 2d 997, 1001 (N.D. Ill. 2001).
47. Id. at 998.
48. Id. at 1000. The defendant cited other reasons for the denial, such as the fact that the
plaintiff could still perform some sedentary work and there was a lack of objective medical evidence of
a disability. Id. The only relevant issue for this Comment, however, deals with the "future risk"
argument. After his application was denied, the plaintiff brought suit pursuant to ERISA. Id. at 998.
49. Id. at 1001.
50. Id; but cf New York Life Ins. Co. v. Harvey, 1998 U.S. App. LEXIS 13703 (4th Cir. 1998)
(where the plaintiff was justifiably denied benefits because he only suffered a mild hard attack, his own
doctor said there was no physical condition preventing him from going back to work, and his heart was
recovered and functioning normally).
51. See, e.g., Colby v. Union Sec. Ins. Co., 705 F.3d 58, 62 (1st Cir. 2013) ("the definitions
contained in the plan make clear that substance abuse, dependence, and addiction ... are conditions that
may give rise to 'sickness' within purview of the plan"); Stanford v. Cont'l Cas. Co., 514 F.3d 354, 358
(4th Cir. 2008) ("Continental did not contest Stanford's characterization of his addiction as a
sickness... .").
52. Allen v. Minn. Life Ins. Co., 216 F. Supp. 2d 1377, 1383 (N.D. Ga. 2001). This is one of the
few cases discussed in this Comment where the underlying benefits plan did not fall within the scope of
ERISA.
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53

and after becoming addicted to Fentanyl,
was admitted to a
rehabilitation facility where he was diagnosed with opiate dependence. 54
While there, the plaintiff applied for LTD benefits from the defendant.5 5
The defendant approved his application and paid him disability benefits
for the next three years, during which time the plaintiff commenced a
full-time practice as an internal medicine physician. 5 Although the
plaintiff still received outpatient treatment, had individual doctor
appointments, attended Alcoholics Anonymous meetings, and was
subjected to random drug screenings, the defendant eventually stopped
paying benefits, reasoning that he had not practiced, or attempted to
practice, anesthesiology in four years.57 Studying the language of the
plan, the court concluded that the plaintiff did not show an
uninterrupted inability to pursue anesthesiology. 59 The court was not
persuaded by the plaintiffs doctor's testimony that plaintiffs own fear
of relapse and his previous history of relapse behavior raised the
potential for relapse if he were to return to anesthesiology. 60 Instead,
the court noted that "future potentialities" did not amount to a present
impediment to the plaintiffs return.61 The court stressed the fact that
the plaintiff had not used drugs in six years, and there was no evidence
that he would regess to such dependence by returning to the practice of
anesthesiology.
53. See supranote 2.
54. Allen, 216 F. Supp. 2d at 1379. He was also diagnosed with alcohol dependence and
depressive disorder. Id. The Virginia Board of Medicine suspended his medical license. Id.
55. Id. The doctor at the rehabilitation center noted that the plaintiff was unable to perform his
regular work due to his opiate dependence, but also indicated that he had no limitations of functional
capacity, was capable of heavy work, and was able to function under stress and engage in personal
relations; the doctor also expected the plaintiff to improve in the future. Id. at 1380. When he was
released a few months later, his prognosis for recovery was considered good, provided that he strictly
adhere to a relapse prevention plan and a continuing care plan. Id. at 1379. While the plaintiff did not
use Fentanyl or alcohol after he was released, his urine showed the possible presence of blocking
samples, and thus he was admitted to another recovery center. Id The doctor at this second facility
made the same observations that the doctor at the first facility made. Id.
56. Id at 1381. His license to practice had since been reinstated. Id. at 1380-81.
57. Id. at 1380. The second rehabilitation facility doctor believed that the plaintiff was disabled
to practice anesthesiology. Id.
58. Which, among other things, required that the disability be a "continuing" one. Id. at 1382.
59. Id. at 1384. The court highlighted that it was undisputed that the plaintiff did not suffer any
physical or mechanical limitations. Id. at 1383.
60. Id. at 1383-84. The doctor believed that remaining away from anesthesiology was part of
the plaintiffs recovery. Id. at 1384.
61. Id. at 1383; accord Forste v. Paul Revere Life & Accident Ins. Co., No. 1:02-cv-1584-RLYTAB, 2004 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 27706, at *33 (S.D. Ind. Sept. 22, 2004) (holding that the plaintiffs risk
of relapse into alcohol abuse was not a presently-existing disability, but instead a future potentiality);
Levitt v. UNUM Life Ins. Co., No. L93-2434 (D. Md. July 15, 1994) (anesthesiologist in remission for
drug addiction not disabled under insurance policy).
62. Allen, 216 F. Supp. 2d at 1384.

Published by University of Cincinnati College of Law Scholarship and Publications, 2018

7

University of Cincinnati Law Review, Vol. 82, Iss. 3 [2018], Art. 7

934

UNIVERSITY OF CINCINNATI LAW REVIEW

[VOL. 82

Other courts have held that the risk of a relapse in an addiction setting
can amount to a current disability. In a Michigan district court case,
Kufner v. Jefferson Pilot Fin. Ins. Co., the jlaintiff was also an
anesthesiologist who became addicted to opioids. After being released
from a treatment center, the plaintiff entered a residential treatment
program, and a few months later, returned to work under doctorimposed restrictions.64 The defendant denied the plaintiff's LTD claim,
noting that his doctor had granted his request to increase his work hours
and he had not experienced any relapses. 65 The court observed that the
defendant's "denial of LTD benefits is based on the rather amorphous
determination that the plaintiff can and should work 70-80 hours a week
as ... an anesthesiologist unless and until he has an actual relapse of his
The court characterized this position as
narcotics addiction."
"untenable" due to the serious risks it posed to public health and safety:
"[d]efendant essentially engaged in a form of 'benefits Russian roulette'
with plaintiffs career and his patients' lives at risk."6 7 Thus, because
there was extensive medical evidence regarding the threat of his relapse,
the plaintiff was entitled to LTD benefits. 68
In Royal Maccabees Life Ins. Co. v. Parker,the Northern District of

Illinois similarly found that the risk of a drug relapse could constitute a
current disability, but it focused its attention on countering the
characterization of an addiction as a "temporary indisposition."69 The
63. Kufner v. Jefferson Pilot Fin. Ins. Co., 595 F. Supp. 2d 785, 788 (W.D. Mich. 2009). He was
also diagnosed with benzazopine abuse, depression, chronic low back pain, and gastroesophageal reflux
disease. Id.
64. Id. at 789. These restrictions included a maximum 40-hour week (his normal was 80 hours),
no on call duties, and he could not dispense narcotics. Id.
65. Id. Pursuant to ERISA, the plaintiff appealed the denial of his benefits. Id. After an
exhaustive review, the defendant upheld the denial of benefits, despite the fact that there were
conflicting medical opinions on whether or not the plaintiff should, or could, return to work. Id. at 79092. The court engaged in a lengthy discussion about the appropriate weight to accord to each of the
doctor's opinions and determined that the plaintiff had presented better medical evidence than the
defendant, quantitatively and qualitatively. Id. at 792-96.
66. Id. at 796.
67. Id. The court felt strongly about this, as it added: "Given that anesthesiology is an
enormously complex and crucial, if not perilous, component of the surgical process, necessarily
entrusted to the judgment and oversight of the healthcare system rather than the individual patient,
defendant's position with regard to disability benefits is tantamount to a breach of the public trust.
Defendant would force plaintiff to work to the brink of failure to justify disability benefits, thereby
imposing an unacceptable risk on patients, hospitals and the public generally. . . ." Id.
68. Id. at 797. The court also noted that administrators of plans under ERISA must abide by a
higher standard of care in discharging their duties, which made the defendant's position all the more
egregious. Id.
69. Royal Maccabees Life Ins. Co. v. Parker, No. 98 C 50422, 2001 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 20563, at
*17 (N.D. Ill. Sept. 20, 2001). The plaintiff there was the insurance company, and it filed a declaratory
judgment against the defendant employee, claiming that it did not owe the latter any disability benefits.
Id. at *1-2. As a side note, this case was vacated by settlement, but that does not render its reasoning
inapplicable. No. 98 C 50422, 2003 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 25965 (N.D. Ill. 2003).
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employee there worked as an emergency room physician until he
became addicted to Vicodin. 70 He subsequently underwent inpatient
addiction treatment, where he was diagnosed with chemical
dependenc ; after being released, he continued outpatient treatment
programs. His employer refused to reinstate him, and he eventually
found other employment. 72 Nearly a year after entering rehab, the
employee submitted a disability claim to the plaintiff insurance
company, which the latter denied, characterizing his sickness as merel
an "addiction in remission." 73 Looking to the dictionary for guidance,
the court asserted that the employee's addiction was not a temporary
indisposition; instead, it was a chronic illness that required long-term
follow-up care, for "the risk of relapse is always present."75
Highlighting the fact that five medical professionals recommended that
the employee not return to his former occupation, the court rejected the
insurance company's argument that the risk of relapse did not prevent
the employee from performing the substantial duties of an emergency
room physician at the present time.7 6
C. The FederalAppellate Split

Like the plaintiffs in Colby, Allen,78 and Kufner 79 Robert Stanford
succumbed to heavy use of the drug Fentanyl.9o And like the
anesthesiologists in those cases, he entered, and completed, an addiction
70. Royal Maccabees Life Ins. Co., 2001 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 20563, at *6.
71. Id.
72. Id. at *7-8.
73. Id. at *8, *15. Since he had entered rehab, the employee had not relapsed on Vicodin, had
fully complied with his after-care program, and was stable in recovery. Id.
74. It defined "sickness" as "illness; disease. An ailment of such a character as to affect the
general soundness and health; not a mere temporary indisposition, which does not tend to undermine
and weaken the constitution." BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 1380 (6th ed. 1990).
75. Royal MaccabeesLife Ins. Co., 2001 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 20563, at *17. This was essentially
the position taken by the recovering drug addict plaintiff in Berry v. Paul Revere Life Ins. Co., 21 So. 3d
385, 392 (La. App. 2009), where he claimed that the risk of relapse is ever-present, thus disabling him
from ever returning to his former occupation. The defendant disagreed, asserting that it would take
"affirmative action on [the plaintiffis] part ... for him to become disabled and unable to perform the
duties of his occupation." Id at 389. In noting that the policy did not categorically exclude the risk of
relapse for drug addiction as a basis for disability, the court held that summary judgment for the
defendant would have been improper. Id. at 394. Notably, in also applying the language of the plan, the
dissent commented that the majority's observation that the policy did not include a "risk of relapse"
provision compelled the exact opposite result: because it was not in the plain language of the plan, it
warranted no coverage. Id. at 399.
76. Royal MaccabeesLife Ins. Co., 2001 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 20563, at *20-21.
77. Colby v. Union Sec. Ins. Co., 705 F.3d 58, 60 (1st Cir. 2013).
78. Allen v. Minn. Life Ins. Co., 216 F. Supp. 2d 1377 (N.D. Ga. 2001).
79. Kufner v. Jefferson Pilot Fin. Ins. Co., 595 F. Supp. 2d 785 (W.D. Mich. 2009).
80. Stanford v. Cont'l Cas. Co., 514 F.3d 354, 355 (4th Cir. 2008).
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treatment and rehabilitation program. ' Unlike those anesthesiologists,
however, he relapsed less than a month later and entered treatment for a
second time.82 While attending this second program, Stanford applied
to Continental Casualty Company (Continental) for LTD benefits, which
were approved. 83 Apparently the treatment did not work; shortly after
returning to work nearly a month after being released from his second
program, Stanford began taking Fentanyl again, causing him to once
again leave work, undergo treatment, and petition for benefits.8 While
Continental approved the benefits for his duration at the clinic, it
notified him that his claim remained under review.8 5 After Stanford's
physician told Continental that he no longer suffered any impairment
that would prevent him from returning to work, Continental terminated
his benefits. 86 Continental denied his appeal, opining that "the policy
does not cover potential risk . ... "

The Fourth Circuit's majority opinion, written by Judge Ellis, began
with a brief look at the mechanics of ERISA.88 Stanford's primary
argument was that Continental abused its discretion by applying an
unreasonably restrictive interpretation of the benefit plan when it
concluded that the plan did not apply to the potential risk of relapse. 89
Continental acknowledged that Stanford's addiction was a sickness, but
it argued that because he no longer suffered from any physical or mental
impairment as a result of it, the fact that he remained an addict did not
render him unable to perform the duties of an anesthesiologist. 90 The
court agreed, making a notable distinction between cases in which the
risk of recurrence of a physical condition did amount to a current
disability9 1 and the situation at hand:

81. Id at 356.
82. Id.
83. Id.
84. Id
85. Id
86. Id Meanwhile, the South Carolina Board of Nursing restricted his license, thus prohibiting
him from having access to narcotics. Id.
87. Id. Stanford then brought suit pursuant to ERISA. Id.
88. Id The court also noted that a conflict of interest can exist when a benefit plan is
administered and funded by the same party. Id. at 357.
89. Id. He also argued that Continental violated ERISA regulations by not consulting with a
health care professional before denying benefits, but as this is irrelevant to the specific focus of this
Comment, it will not be discussed. Id. at 358. The court first turned its analysis to the actual language
of the plan, which defined a "disability" as an "injury or sickness caus[ing] physical or mental
impairment to such a degree of severity that you are . .. continuously unable to perform the material and
substantial duties of your regular occupation." Id.
90. Id.
91. See, e.g., Saliamonas v. CNA, Inc., 127 F. Supp. 2d 997 (N.D. Ill. 2001); Lasser v. Reliance
Standard Life Ins. Co., 344 F.3d 381 (3d Cir. 2003).
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But the risk of a heart attack is different from the risk of relapse into drug
use. A doctor with a heart condition who enters a high-stress
environment like an operating room "risks relapse" in the sense that the
performance of his job duties may cause a heart attack. But an
anesthesiologist with a drug addiction who enters an environment where
drugs are readily available "risks relapse" only in the sense that the ready
availability of drugs increases his temptation to resume his drug use.
Whether he succumbs to that temptation remains his choice; the heartattack prone doctor has no such choice.9 2
While the Fourth Circuit did acknowledge that some courts have found
that the risk of relapse in an addiction context can constitute a current
disability, 93 it observed that because there are cases directly to the
contrary, Continental's decision was not unreasonable. 94
The court then conceded that its holding would require Stanford to
return to work and suffer a relapse in order to qualify for LTD benefits:
"We recognize that this creates a somewhat troubling-some might say
perverse-incentive structure: an addict who continues to abuse drugs
will be entitled to long-term benefits, but upon achieving sobriety will
lose those benefits unless he again begins to use drugs." 95 The court
reasoned its way around this startling realization by asserting that such
an argument operates on the false assumption that disability benefits act
as a reward for sobriety. 96 Countering this "assumption," Judge Ellis
wrote, "sobriety's reward is the creation of innumerable opportunities
that were closed to Stanford as long as he continued to use drugs." 9 7
While these opportunities did not include returning to work as an
anesthesiologist, because "no prudent addict would place himself in
such a position," 98 the court proclaimed that "[s]uch prudence is a part
of recovery, and it can have significant costs-but these costs are greatly
outweighed by the opportunities sobriety provides." 99 The court noted
that Stanford was not physically disabled or mentally impaired, and it
concluded by observing, "[i]t would be truly perverse if Stanford were
to go on to great success in another occupation but was still able to
92. Stanford,514 F.3d at 358.
93. E.g., Royal Maccabees Life Ins. Co. v. Parker, No. 98 C 50422, 2001 U.S. Dist. LEXIS
20563 (N.D. Ill. Sept. 20, 2001).
94. Stanford, 514 F.3d at 359. The court asserted, "[g]iven this widespread, thoughtful, and
reasonable disagreement, Continental's decision cannot plausibly be termed unreasonable."
Id
Pointing out a case that directly contradicted Royal Maccabees, the Fourth Circuit cited Allen v. Minn.
Life lns. Co., 216 F. Supp. 2d 1377 (N.D. Ga. 2001).
95. Stanford, 514 F.3d at 359.
96. Id.
97. Id
98. Id. The court also noted that Stanford could not return to work as an anesthesiologist as his
license was limited. Id
99. Id.
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00
collect insurance checks on the basis of 'disability."'
In a scathing dissent, Judge Wilkinson criticized the majority,
commenting that it seemed driven by "moral opprobrium" rather than
sound legal analysis.o10 Judge Wilkinson began his dissent by simply
interpreting the language of the insurance policy at hand, affirming what
neither party denied: addiction qualifies as a sickness that causes mental
impairment.' 02 Regarding Continental's position that the policy did not
cover "potential risk," the dissent emphasized that "potential risk"' is
redundant because "'potential risk' is just risk."l 03 Judge Wilkinson
was equally perplexed by Continental's assertion that "a risk of relapse
is not evidence of current impairment; instead, it is a future, potential
concern.,,104 Noting that addicts are not the only medical patients who
relapse, the dissent asserted, "all agree that Stanford cannot presently
return to work in safety, and if we ask why not, the answer must be
some existing, not future, impairment-namely, [his] fentanyl
addiction."o Judge Wilkinson solidified this point by remarking that
the plan contained an "Exclusions and Limitations" section that notably
said nothing about "potential risk," and thus, the majority permitted
Continental to carve out an unwritten exception. 06
The dissent also emphasized the "perverse incentive" that the
majority's decision would create and did not find persuasive the fact that
Stanford would be able to work "countless other jobs,"10 7 because the
plan defined disabilit as the inability to perform the duties of one's
regular occupation.' 0
Further, "[florcing Stanford to relapse into

addiction or lose his benefits would . .. thwart the very purpose for

which disability plans exist: to help people overcome medical adversity
if possible, and otherwise cope with it."109 Judge Wilkinson observed

100. Id. at 359-60.
101. Id. at 365 (Wilkinson, J., dissenting). The dissent said, "[t]he moral and medical choices are
not this court's to make. They belong to those who bargained for the Plan-and who have something at
stake in it." Id. at 363 (Wilkinson, J., dissenting).
102. Id at 361 (Wilkinson, J., dissenting). Wilkinson noted that the plan defined "mental
impairment" as all disorders found in the current diagnostic standards manual of the American
Psychiatric Association, which devotes a full section to substance-related disorders, "addiction notably
among them." Id. (Wilkinson, J., dissenting). That is why Continental paid Stanford benefits for as
long as it did. Id. (Wilkinson, J., dissenting). He stressed that not even Continental denied that Stanford
could not, "with any safety," perform his duties as an anesthesia nurse, and "not a shred of contrary
evidence was every presented. . . ." Id. (Wilkinson, J., dissenting).
103. Id. (Wilkinson, J., dissenting).
104. Id. at 362 (Wilkinson, J., dissenting).
105. Id. (Wilkinson, J., dissenting).
106. Id. (Wilkinson, J., dissenting).
107. Id. at 359.
108. Id at 362 (Wilkinson, J., dissenting).
109. Id. (Wilkinson, J., dissenting).
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that Continental's unwritten exception would seem to exclude all
medical conditions whose "effect is to create grave medical risk,
conditions that make doing one's job, though not literally impossible,
unreasonably dangerous." o Solidifying this argument, the dissent
highlighted the treatise definition of "disability," which holds that "the
insured is considered to be permanently and totally disabled when it is
impossible to work without hazarding his or her health or risk his or her
life.""' Thus, the dissent turned its inquiry to determining the
likelihood and gravity of the risk of Stanford's relapse.112 In observing
that every medical opinion in the record indicated that Stanford should
not have returned to work as an anesthesia nurse due to his risk of
relapse, Judge Wilkinson concluded that because Stanford had presented
substantial evidence of disability, he should have been awarded his LTD
benefits. 113
The Colby opinion reached the same conclusion that Judge Wilkinson
did in Stanford b' holding that the risk of relapse can constitute a
current disability.
After briefly noting the deference that an ERISA
plan gives to its administrators, Judge Selya, writing for a unanimous
First Circuit, addressed the literal language of the plan. 116 The court
emphasized that substance abuse, dependence, and addiction are
considered sicknesses under the plan, and the risk of relapse in Dr.
Colby's case was "particularly acute because returning to
110. Id. (Wilkinson, J., dissenting).
111. Id at 363 (Wilkinson, J., dissenting) (citing JOHN ALAN APPLEMAN, 31 APPLEMAN ON
INSURANCE § 187.05[A], at 214 (2d ed. 2007)). Judge Wilkinson proffered some examples to explain
why potential risk can amount to current impairment. Id. at 363 (Wilkinson, J., dissenting). For
instance, some back conditions would leave a patient literally able to lift heavy objects, but at risk of
partial paralysis upon doing so. Id (Wilkinson, J., dissenting).
112. Id. at 364 (Wilkinson, J., dissenting).
113. Id. at 365 (Wilkinson, J., dissenting). The medical evidence was clear to Judge Wilkinson.
First, Stanford had relapsed twice before and when he was released to work after a third treatment
program, the doctor restricted him from having access to narcotics. Id. at 364 (Wilkinson, J.,
dissenting). Second, Stanford submitted an article about the "apparently common problem of
anesthesiologists becoming addicted to" Fentanyl. Id. (Wilkinson, J., dissenting); See Eric. B. Hedberg,
Anesthesiologists: Addicted to the Drugs They Administer, AM. Soc. ANESTHESIOLOGIST NEWSLETTER,
May 2001 (stating that only about half of opiate-addicted anesthesia personnel can retum to their
profession even after substantial treatment); Ethan 0. Bryson & Jeffrey Silverstein, Addiction and
Substance Abuse in Anesthesiology, NATIONAL INSTITUTE OF HEALTH, Nov. 2008, at 905-917 (Between
1991-2001, 80% of U.S. anesthesiology residency programs reported experience with impaired
residents). Finally, the dissent found persuasive the fact that Fentanyl has an analgesic potency of about
80 times that of morphine, which led to its rampant use among medical personnel. Stanford, 514 F.3d at
365 (Wilkinson, J., dissenting).
114. Colby v. Union Sec. Ins. Co., 705 F.3d 58 (1st Cir. 2013).
115. Id at 61. The abuse of discretion standard in an ERISA context is equivalent to the arbitrary
and capricious standard. Id. The court stressed that applying a deferential standard of review did not
mean that the plan's administrator would prevail on the merits. Id.
116. Id. at 62-63.
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work ... would afford her easy access to opioids and other addictive
substances."I 17 The court found persuasive the abundance of evidence
indicating that there was a high risk of relapse into opioid dependence if
Dr. Colby had returned to work.11 8 Ultimately, the First Circuit's
biggest concern was USIC's categorical exclusion of risk of relapse
from coverage.11 9 Given the language of the plan, which did not
mention risk of relapse, much less categorically exclude it, the denial of
benefits on the ground that a risk of relapse cannot amount to a current
disability was unreasonable, especially given the Act's mandate that
plan administrators use their discretion to process claims solely in the
interests of the participants and beneficiaries of the plan.120 The court
found unavailing USIC's argument that the risk of relapse was a
"speculative future possibility," while the plan's language was crafted in
the present tense; again, it was the absolute exclusion of risk of relapse,
without any further investigation into the likelihood of that risk, that
proved fatal for USIC.121
The First Circuit then turned its analysis to the risk of relapse in other
contexts, asserting that "risk of relapse is not a concept peculiar to the
realm of substance abuse and addiction." 22 The court conceded Dr.
Colby was not physically unable to perform the motions of her
occupation; instead, it found that her risk of relapse was prohibitively
Judge Selya also
impairing, thus amounting to a current disability.
expounded on the "perverse incentive" that such a denial of benefits
would create, stressing that it would not only put Dr. Colby herself at
risk, but it would also endanger her patients: "denying benefits to an
117. Id at 63.
118. Id For example, her physician recommended that she not return to the field of medicine for
at least six months and Dr. Colby was arrested for driving under the influence of alcohol six months
after being released from treatment. Id. Additionally, her therapist linked her opioid dependence to her
back pain, her "turbulent" personal life, and the stresses of her job; thus, the therapist opined that
returning to work and facing exposure to her drug of choice could exacerbate these other conditions. Id.
at 63-64. Numerous other medical experts averred to Dr. Colby's high risk of relapse. Id. The court
did note that it could have been possible for USIC to limit the period of disability by arguing that the
risk progressively diminished over the 36-month period. Id. at 64.
119. Id. at 65. USIC's initial motion posited that "a mere risk of relapse into a prior, selfcontrolled condition is not ... [a] condition that would preclude the plaintiff from working in her
occupation." Id at 64.
120. Id. at 66. The court stressed that this was all the more important in an ERISA case, where
exclusions from coverage are not favored in an ERISA plan: "Plucking an exclusion for risk of relapse
out of thin air would undermine the integrity of an ERISA plan." Id. at 65.
121. Id.
122. Id. at 66.
123. Id. The court analogized her situation to that of an air traffic controller with a seizure
disorder, holding that the latter may be totally disabled with respect to her regular occupation because
the runway's flickering lights put her at a grave risk of convulsive episodes. Id. The fact that she could
was not literally unable to work as an air traffic controller did not mean that she was not prohibitively
impaired from doing so due to her risk of relapse. Id.
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anesthesiologist 'unless and until ... an actual relapse of a narcotics
addiction [occurs] .. . is untenable given the serious risk this poses to

public health and safety."'l24 Ultimately, the court's holding was a
narrow one that hinged on the plain language of the plan and "USIC's
all-or-nothing approach to its benefits determination."l25 Had USIC
written an exclusion into the plan or conducted a more in-depth factual
inquiry to assess the degree of the risk of relapse, the First Circuit may
have decided the case differently.126
III. DiscussioN

In his dissent in Stanford, Judge Wilkinson proposed that rather than
being grounded in law or the language of the underlying plan, the
special exclusion for drug addicts that was adopted by the majority was
instead the product of "moral opprobrium." 127 While the other justices
on the Fourth Circuit likely took exception to that accusation, it is hard
to fathom any other explanation. The First Circuit's recent decision in
Colbyl28 was the first at the appellate level to accept the argument that a
risk of relapse of a substance addiction could constitute a current
disability. In so holding, the First Circuit reached the correct result, but
missed a golden opportunity to set a stronger precedent. The risk of
relapse in a substance abuse context can constitute a current disability
under ERISA because simple policy interpretation so requires; to hold
otherwise would incentivize drug use; and the debilitating nature of
addiction compels that conclusion.
A. Policy Interpretation
Mere interpretation of the policies at issue in the above-mentioned
cases dictates that the risk of relapse should constitute a current
disability, but this conclusion could have an impact on the way such
policies are drafted in the future.129 Insurance contracts are controlled
124. Id.
125. Id.
126. Id. The court also noted that USIC did suggest that it would have been a reasonable work
accommodation for another healthcare professional to monitor and supervise Dr. Colby's exposure to
opioids, thus permitting her to return to work. Id. at 67. This suggestion, however, came too late as this
possible accommodation was not mentioned until four years after USIC first denied LTD benefits to Dr.
Colby. Id.
127. Stanford v. Cont'l Cas. Co., 514 F.3d 354, 365 (4th Cir. 2008) (Wilkinson, J., dissenting).
128. Colby, 705 F.3d 58.
129. In order to claim disability benefits, an employee's plan must cover the alleged disability,
and thus interpreting the provisions of the plans at issue is crucial. Filing a Claim for Your Health or
Disability

Benefits,

UNITED

STATES

DEPARTMENT

OF

LABOR,

http://www.dol.gov/ebsa/publications/filingbenefitsclaim.html (last visited Jan. 8, 2014).
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by the same rules of construction as are other contracts, and thus, the
goal of interpreting insurance policies is to ascertain the intent of the
parties.1 30 Ambiguities in coverage are to be construed in favor of
coverage, while exclusions will be narrowly construed against the
insurer.13 1 The language of the contract itself is the "first and most
important reference when interpreting a contract."1 32
Engaging in this formulaic policy interpretation, courts should reach
the conclusion that if a plan does not exclude the risk of relapse from
coverage, then such risk should warrant coverage.1 33 The language in
these plans does not even mention the risk of relapse, much less contain
a categorical bar to providing coverage for it, but the Fourth Circuit in
Stanford nonetheless concluded that the risk of relapse should not be
covered if the policy does not expressly provide for it. 134 This runs
counter to the aforementioned principles of policy interpretation for two
reasons. First, the plans in both Stanford'35 and Colbyl 3 6 defined a
disability as an injury or sickness that renders one unable to
continuously perform the material duties of his regular occupation.
Thus, to conclude that the risk of relapse does not warrant coverage if
the plan does not specifically provide for it necessarily entails skipping a
step. Insurance companies and courts should not focus on whether or
not the plan specifically provides for certain coverage 37 but should
instead determine whether the alleged illness fits within the plan's
definition of a disability. For instance, if an employee is hurt at work
and breaks his back, surely an insurance company would not argue that
130. Peter Nash Swisher, Judicial Interpretations of Insurance Contract Disputes: Toward a
Realistic Middle GroundApproach, 57 OHIO ST. L.J. 543, 566 (1996). But cf Hon. Randall H. Warner,
All Mixed Up About Contract: When is ContractInterpretationa Legal Question and When is it a Fact
Question, 5 VA. L. & Bus. REV. 81, 83 (2010) (noting that another method of contract interpretation
revolves around construing the language of the plan and analogizing it to other case law interpreting
similar language).
131. Swisher, supra note 130, at 566.
132. Jay E. Grenig, Principles of Contract Interpretation: Interpreting Collective Bargaining
Agreements, 16 CAP. U. L. REV. 31, 36 (1986).
133. Some courts have taken this approach. See, e.g., Colby, 705 F.3d 58; Hannagan v. Piedmont
Airlines, Inc., No. 3:07-CV-795, 2010 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 31472, at *13-14 (N.D.N.Y. Mar. 31, 2010)
("Defendant['s] . . . policy does not expressly exclude risk of future harm or future manifestations of
symptoms from coverage; and, therefore, its failure to consider such is arbitrary and capricious.");
Stanford v. Cont'l Cas. Co., 514 F.3d 354, 362 (4th Cir. 2008) (Wilkinson, J., dissenting) ("The chief
problem with excluding 'potential risk of relapse' from coverage is that the exclusion has no support
whatsoever in the language of the Plan.").
134. Stanford, 514 F.3d at 358.
13 5. Id.
136. Colby, 705 F.3d at 67.
137. As the insurance company in Stanford did. The dissent in Berry v. Paul Revere Life Ins. Co.,
21 So. 3d 385, 397 (La. Ct. App. 2009), incorrectly employed similar reasoning: "The issue is not
whether [plaintiffs] risk of relapse is so great that he is incapable of performing the material functions
of his job, but whether risk of relapse is covered by the policy language in question."
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a broken back is not specifically provided in the plan; rather, it would
ask whether or not that injury constituted a disability in conformity with
the terms of the plan. Second, ambiguities in such policies are to be
construed against the insurer; that is, they should be resolved in favor of
coverage. This is even more telling in an ERISA case, where exclusions
from coverage are not favored given the Act's mandate that plan
administrators process claims "solely in the interests of the participants
and beneficiaries of the plan." 38
Many insurance companies have argued that as the risk of relapse is a
"future potentiality," it is not covered when the language of the plan is
phrased in the present tense. 139 This is nonsensical because, as Judge
Wilkinson notes in his dissent in Stanford, "the phrase 'potential risk' is
a redundancy; 'potential risk' is just risk."1 40 Likewise, the Saliamonas
court correctly rejected the insurance company's contention that the risk
of relapse was a future possibility: "This is not a future condition, but
rather, a present risk."1 4 "Risk" is defined as "the possibility of loss or
injury,"'
while "potential" is similarly defined as "existing in
possibility."l 43 Attempting to circumvent a plan written in the present
tense by claiming that "future" or "potential" risk is not covered is
redundant, and courts should find such an argument unavailint Indeed,
the risk of relapse is ever-present, as will be discussed below.
This conclusion could have some implications for the way such
policies are drafted in the future, especially after Colby: "Our holding
today is narrow. It pivots on the fusion of the plain language of the
plan ... USIC could have written into the plan an exclusion for risk of
relapse, but it did not choose to do so."l145 Whether or not such
exclusions will be included in policies in the future remains to be seen,
but as the rest of this Comment will argue, the risk of relapse likely will
138. 29 U.S.C. § 1104(a)(1) (2012).
139. See, e.g., Allen v. Minn. Life Ins. Co., 216 F. Supp. 2d 1377, 1383 (N.D. Ga. 2001) (where
the court held that the doctor's recommendation that the plaintiff not return to work was based on
"future potentialities rather than any present impediment"); Saliamonas v. CNA, Inc., 127 F. Supp. 2d
997, 1002 (N.D. Ill. 2001) (insurance company claimed that the policy did not insure against "future
risks or possible loss"); Stanford v. Cont'l Cas. Co., 514 F.3d 354, 361 (4th Cir. 2008) (insurance
company argued that the policy did not cover "potential risk of relapse").
140. Stanford, 514 F.3d at 362 (Wilkinson, J., dissenting).
141. Saliamonas, 127 F. Supp. 2d at 1001.
142. "Risk,"

MERRIAM-WEBSTER

DICTIONARY

(2012),

available at http://www.merriam-

webster.com/.
143. "Potential," MERRIAM-WEBSTER DICTIONARY (2012), available at http://www.merriamwebster.com/.
144. See infra Part III.C.2.
145. Colby v. Union Sec. Ins. Co., 705 F.3d 58, 67 (1st Cir. 2013); accord Stanford, 514 F.3d at
363 (Wilkinson, J., dissenting) ("The moral and medical choices are not this court's to make. They
belong to those who bargained for the Plan . . . .").
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be, and should be, just as protected as the addiction itself.
B. Not ProvidingCoveragefor the Risk ofRelapse Incentivizes Drug
Use
Denying a former or recovering addict's claim for LTD benefits is
unreasonable at best and potentially deadly at worst because it creates a
perverse incentive. Take for instance Robert Stanford, the trained nurse
anesthetist who became addicted to a drug he was administering to his

patients.146 After completing a third treatment program for his opiate
dependence, Stanford was denied his benefits after his physician told the
defendant insurance company that he was no longer addicted to the
drug; the physician did, however, indicate that Stanford remained at risk
for relapse if exposed to the drug again.147 Stanford then returned to the
environment that prompted his addiction in the first place and was
presented with two choices: lose his disability benefits while he tried to
stay sober or indulge in his addiction for the fourth time and once again
receive benefits. Undoubtedly the former is the much more difficult,
and sometimes a nearly impossible, option to choose.148 This truly puts
people like Stanford in a "cruel" position, for it incentivizes abusing a
drug which many former addicts have spent months and sometimes
years trying to stop using.14 9 This is not to say that refusing to use the
drug is not a viable option; rather, it is a very difficult option to take,
especially with addict's knowledge that she will receive disability
benefits upon doing so.

Creating this incentive not only forces recovering addicts into relapse,
but it also "thwart[s] the very purpose for which disability plans exist: to
hel people overcome medical adversity if possible, and to cope with

it."
Denying benefits for the risk of relapse encourages former
addicts to abandon whatever progress they have made in attempting to
overcome their drug dependence.
Despite expressly acknowledging
this "perverse incentive structure," the Fourth Circuit in Stanford
finessed itself around such a disturbing realization by claiming that it
146. Stanford, 514 F.3d at 355.
147. Id. at 355-57.
148. As discussed infra Part U.C.
149. Stanford, 541 F.3d at 365 (Wilkinson, J., dissenting).
150. Id. at 362 (Wilkinson, J., dissenting). Indeed, these plans would not replace, partially or
wholly, the income of employees who are disabled if their purpose was not to give them time to recover
after a sickness or accident.
151. This applies in substance abuse and nonsubstance abuse cases alike. See, e.g., Saliamonas v.
CNA, Inc., 127 F. Supp. 2d 997, 1001 (N.D. Ill. 2001) ("To suggest .. . that a permanent heart condition
that may be aggravated by stress can only rise to the level of a disability when and if the insured suffers
a heart attack is unreasonable.").
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operates on the false assumption that "benefits are a sort of reward for
sobriety."l 52 Instead, "sobriety's reward," the court countered, is "the
creation of innumerable opportunities that were closed to Stanford as
long as he continued to use drugs," and thus it would be unreasonable to
allow Stanford to start another job and continue to receive disability
benefits.15 3 That Stanford could have applied to other jobs is irrelevant,
for the language in the plan at issue, and nearly all of the plans
mentioned in this Comment, defined disability as the inability to
Surely a
perform the duties of "your regular occupation."1 54
construction worker who injures his back could choose to apply for a job
inputting data into a computer, but the purpose of providing such an
employee with LTD benefits in the first place is to support him so that
he can adequately recover and return to work as a construction worker.
This coverage for the inability to work in one's "normal occupation" is
precisely the reason why none of these plans include a stipulation that
the disabled employee will only receive benefits if she is unable to find
another job.
Denying coverage unless and until a plaintiff actually suffers a
relapse not only places the recovering drug addict in danger, but it can
also put others in jeopardy. Specifically in the context of health care
practitioners, the denial of benefits for the risk of relapse is tantamount
to a form of "'benefits Russian roulette' with [the employee's] career
and his patients' lives at risk." 55 Such a stand "would force plaintiff to
work to the brink of failure to justify disability benefits, thereby
imposing an unacceptable risk on patients, hospitals, and the public
generally . . . ."156 Such a danger is particularly acute in the field of
anesthesiology:
One of the most disabling problems for opiate dependent
anesthesiologists is the tremendous distracting obsession about their drug
of choice. During surgery and administration of anesthetics, many
152. Stanford, 514 F.3d at 359.
153. Id. The court added that "no prudent addict would place himself in such a position." Id.
Such a statement belies the true nature of addiction as will be discussed infra Part III.C.
154. Id. at 362.
155. Kufier v. Jefferson Pilot Fin. Ins. Co., 595 F. Supp. 2d 785, 796 (W.D. Mich. 2009); accord
Colby v. Union Sec. Ins. Co., 705 F.3d 58, 66-67 (1st Cir. 2013). The Kufner court added: "Given that
anesthesiology is an enormously complex and crucial, if not perilous, component of the surgical
process .. .defendant's position with regard to disability benefits is tantamount to a breach of the public
trust." Kufner, 595 F. Supp. 2d at 797. The Hannagan court expressed the same sentiments in the
nonsubstance abuse context: "it is not that a return to work would necessarily further aggravate his
condition; the disability arises from the grave risk that Plaintiff would pose to himself and [others]."
Hannagan v. Piedmont Airlines, Inc., No. 3:07-CV-795 (FJS/DEP), 2010 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 31472, at
*16 (N.D.N.Y. Mar. 31, 2010).
156. Id. This is particularly egregious considering ERISA's imposition of higher-thanmarketplace quality standards on insurance plan administrators. Id at 797.
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anesthesiologists are fighting obsession and craving ... due to their
obsessions, the anesthetized patients are receiving their partial attention
and are being placed at an unacceptable risk during surgery .... [Thus,]
the anesthesiologist is incapable of performing the substantive duties of
their job.' 57
This risk is not merely a theoretical one. Take for instance a Louisiana
doctor who attended a procedure while under the influence of drugs
following a relapse.
Due to his drug use, he made a mistake that
rendered the patient under his care in a permanent vegetative state.159
While addiction in the medical profession undoubtedly entails a greater
risk to others, similar perils could arise in a myriad of other
occupations.1 60 This danger, in itself, mandates that the risk of relapse
should be treated as a current disability.
C. Addiction as a ChronicIllness
Drug addiction is a chronic illness,161 is classified as a mental
disorder by the DSM-IV,162 and affects millions of people each year.163
Not surprisingly then, none of the insurance companies in any of the
above cases disputed the fact that substance dependence itself warranted
157. Hellman v. Union Cent. Life Ins. Co., 175 F. Supp. 2d 1044, 1048 n.2 (M.D. Tenn. Oct. 18,
2001).
158. Berry v. Paul Reverse Life Ins. Co., 21 So. 3d 385, 386 (La. Ct. App. 2009).
159. Id. at 386.
160. For example, a truck driver who risks relapse of a heart attack; an airplane pilot who risks
relapse of seizures; a lifeguard who risks relapse of fainting, etc. The unique problem posed by the
medical profession is two-fold: first, that the doctors are using the drugs they are administering to
patients; and second, that drug is causing them to harm others if they attempt to practice while abusing
the drug.
161. DrugFacts: Understanding Drug Abuse and Addiction, NATIONAL INSTITUTE ON DRUG
(last visited
ABUSE, www.drugabuse.gov/publications/drugfacts/understanding-drug-abuse-addiction
Jan. 8, 2014) (defining addiction as "a chronic, often relapsing brain disease that causes compulsive
drug seeking and use, despite harmful consequences to the addicted individual and to those around him
or her"); Alan Leshner, Addiction is a Brain Disease, and it Matters, SCIENCE, Oct. 1997, at 45-47; A.
Thomas McLellan et al., Drug Dependence, a Chronic Medical Illness: Implications for Treatment,
Insurance, and Outcomes Evaluation, THE JOURNAL OF THE AMERICAN MEDICAL ASSOCIATION, Oct.
2000, at 1689; William White, Michael Boyle & David Loveland, Alcoholism/Addiction as a Chronic
Disease, ALCOHOLISM TREATMENT QUARTERLY, Oct. 2000, at 107.
162. The Diagnostic and Statistical Manual of Mental Disorders (DSM-IV) is published by the
American Psychiatric Association and is the standard classification of mental disorders by mental health
professionals in the United States. It recognizes both substance abuse and substance dependence as
mental disorders. See AMERICAN PSYCHIATRIC ASSOCIATION, I DSM-IV SOURCEBOOK (Washington
D.C. 1994).
163. See generally Drug Addiction Statistics, US No DRUGS: HANDLING ADDICTION AND
RESTORING LIVES, http://www.usnodrugs.com/drug-addiction-statistics.htm (last visited Jan. 8, 2014);
Linda Batiste, Accommodation and Compliance Series: Employees with Drug Addiction, JOB
ACCOMMODATION NETWORK, availableat http://askjan.org/medialdrugadd.html (estimated 21.6 million
persons age 12 or older classified with substance dependence or abuse).
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coverage under the respective plans.164 Despite the recognition of the
severity of drug addiction and thus the unanimous inclusion of it in the
purview of a plan's definition of "disability," many insurance companies
and courts have been hesitant to also include the risk of relapse into that
definition, reasoning that addiction, as opposed to other chronic
illnesses, is a voluntary choice. Such a conclusion is not only
incongruous with the remainder of the plans at issue, but it is medically
incorrect and runs afoul of the true nature of the disease, for the risk of
relapse is part of the illness and is ever-present.
1. Addiction as a Voluntary Choice
The Stanford court distinguished the risk of relapse into drug use
from the risk of relapse of purely physical ailments by asserting, "an
anesthesiologist . . . 'risks relapse' only in the sense that the ready
availability of drugs increases his temptation to resume his drug use.
Whether he succumbs to that temptation remains his choice. . . .,,165
Such a conclusion is illogical for three reasons.
First, it was undisputed that the plan at issue provided coverage for
substance dependence. If the insurance company really wanted to
advance the argument that drug addiction differs to such an extent from
other disabilities due to the alleged voluntariness of it, why provide LTD
benefits for the addiction itself in the first place? Obviously the parties
thought the underlying illness debilitating to the point that it warranted
protection under the plan; under the court's reasoning, becoming
addicted to the drug in the first place necessarily involved a voluntary
choice as well, yet it was still defined as a disability in the policy.
Second, that drug addiction is a purely voluntary choice is a
stereotype about substance abuse that has been debunked and holds no
water in the medical community. 166 While the public may continue to
164. See, e.g., Colby v. Union Sec. Ins. Co., 705 F.3d 58, 62 (1st Cir. 2013) ("The definitions
contained in the plan make clear that substance abuse, dependence, and addiction-like mental illness
more generally-are conditions that may give rise to 'sickness' within the purview of the plan");
Stanford v. Cont'l Cas. Co., 514 F.3d 354, 356 (4th Cir. 2008) (insurance company approved plaintiff's
application for LTD benefits while he was in rehabilitation); Allen v. Minn. Life Ins. Co., 216 F. Supp.
2d 1377, 1381 (N.D. Ga. 2001) (same).
165. Stanford, 514 F.3d at 358; accord Jeffrey A. Schaler, Drugs and Free Will, SOCIETY,
Sept./Oct. 1991, at 42-44 ("Drug addicts simply have different values from the norm and often refuse to
take responsibility for their actions. Public policy based on the disease model of addiction enables this
avoidance to continue by sanctioning it in the name of helping people.").
166. Sonja Starr, Simple Fairness: Ending Discrimination in Health Insurance Coverage of
Addiction Treatment, 111 YALE L.J. 2321, 2325-26 (2002) ("Alive as it may be in the public mind, the
idea that people are addicts by choice has long since lost currency among medical experts. Medical
descriptions of addiction as a disease date to the eighteenth century.") (citing John N. Chappel, Attitudes
Toward the Treatment of Substance Abusers, in SUBSTANCE ABUSE 983, 984 (Joyce H. Lowinson et al.
eds., 2d ed. 1992)); Robinson v. California, 370 U.S. 660, 667 n.9 (1962) (noting that addiction may not
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think of drug addiction as a failure of character, a moral flaw, or a mere
surrender to temptation, drug addiction has a clear biological basis:
"Addiction . .. is a disorder of the brain no different from other forms of

mental illness."l 67 Thus, while the Stanford majority asserted that "no
prudent addict" would put herself in a drug-laden environment, it
operated on the false assumption that such addicts can rationally and
totally control their disability. 6 8
Third, it is true that "addiction undeniably has an underlying
behavioral basis, and the initial behavior that triggers a cycle of
addiction is generally voluntary."l 69 There is an argument to be made
that the purpose of health insurance is to protect people from harms
inflicted by chance, not to spread the costs of self-inflicted injuries.170
While not without merit, such a claim "appears disingenuous. . . when
applied solely to addiction as opposed to other diseases ... [that] stem at
least in part from behavioral choices."171 Many illnesses, including lung
cancer, high blood pressure, heart disease, and diabetes are influenced, if
not caused, by voluntary choices and lifestyle decisions.1 72 Even many
commonplace accidents that result in personal in ury and subsequent
insurance coverage are the fault of the insured.
Thus, to base the
denial of LTD benefits on the allegation that drug addiction is somehow
more voluntary than other covered diseases is arbitrary and without
empirical support.

be a voluntary condition and explaining: "Not only may addiction innocently result from the use of
medically prescribed narcotics, but a person may even be a narcotics addict from the moment of his
birth."); Id. at 670 (Douglas, J., concurring) ("The first step to addiction may be as innocent as a boy's
puff on a cigarette in an alleyway. It may come from medical prescriptions. Addiction may even be
present at birth.").
167. Starr, supra note 166, at 2326 (quoting J. Madeleine Nash, Addicted: Why Do People Get
Hooked? Mounting Evidence Points to a Powerful Brain Chemical Called Dopamine, TIME, May 5,
1997, at 68, 70; Drug, Brains,and Behavior: The Science of Addiction, NATIONAL INSTITUTE ON DRUG
ABUSE, http://www.drugabuse.gov/publications/science-addiction/drug-abuse-addiction (last visited Jan.
8, 2014) (noting several factors that can increase the risk of addiction)).
168. Stanford,514 F.3d at 359.
169. Starr, supranote 166. "An individual may be genetically predisposed toward alcoholism, but
she cannot become an alcoholic without ever taking a drink." Id.
170. Id. When a person chooses to use drugs for the first time then, they should not expect
sympathy if "that risk is actualized." Id.
171. Id at 2336.
172. Id. Expounding on this point, Starr continues, "[w]e drive too fast, or we smoke, or we do
not exercise enough, or we eat too many carbohydrates. Why, then, single out addiction for the type of
moral condemnation implied by the voluntariness argument?" Id
173. Take for instance car accidents. No insurer would deny LTD benefits to a day laborer who
was injured in a car crash and could not work for six months, despite the fact that the insured may have
caused the crash.
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2. Risk of Relapse as Part of the Disease
Perhaps the gravest mistake that insurance companies and courts
make regarding the denial of coverage for the risk of relapse is the
assumption that such a risk is itself not part of the underlying addiction.
Again, the inclusion of coverage for the addiction in the first place is
telling because the insurance companies thought it warranted protection;
not providing similar treatment for the risk of relapse overlooks the fact
that such a risk is part of the disability.
The treatise definition of "disability" posits that "the insured is
considered ... disabled when it is impossible to work without hazarding
his or her health or risking his or her life."l 7 4 Relapsing into a drug
addiction certainly poses this risk. This risk itself makes the ability to
work prohibitively impairing, and thus, while working may not be
literally impossible, it would be unreasonably dangerous. For example,
"we would not deny disability benefits to a laborer" whose back
condition would not render him literally unable to lift heavy objects but
who risks paralysis upon doing so. 175 Similarly, an air traffic controller
with a seizure disorder may be totally disabled with respect to her
regular occupation because the runway's flickering lights put her at a
grave risk of convulsive episodes; the fact that she was not literally
unable to work as an air traffic controller did not mean that she was not
prohibitively impaired from doing so due to her risk of relapse.176 Such
a risk is all the more prevalent in the anesthesiology setting where
opiate-dependent doctors and nurses are fighting the "tremendous
distraction about their drug of choice," which just happens to be the
same drug they are working with all day.' 77 Because the risk of relapse
174. Stanford, 514 F.3d at 363 (Wilkinson, J., dissenting) (quoting JOHN APPLEMAN, 31
APPLEMAN ON INSURANCE § 187.05[A], at 214 (2d ed. 2007)). Not only is the drug addict's life in
danger here, but incentivizing drug use also poses risks to others in such a context, as discussed supra
Part III.B.
175. Stanford, 514 F.3d at 363 (Wilkinson, J., dissenting). Likewise, "when busy professionals
with cardiac troubles have brought ERISA suits because workplace stress caused a risk of heart attack,
they have typically prevailed." Id.
176. Colby v. Union Sec. Ins. Co., 705 F.3d 58, 66 (1st Cir. 2013). The same would be true of a
football player who broke his leg. Once his leg is healed, if his doctors recommend that he stay away
from practice for a while to avoid re-injuring it right away, surely no insurance company would claim
that such a risk is not provided for.
177. Supra note 157. This apparently is a common problem amongst anesthesiologists. The
plaintiff in Stanford submitted an article during his appeal regarding the opiate addiction problems in his
field. Stanford, 514 F.3d at 364 (Wilkinson, J. dissenting). The article stated that only about half of
opiate-addicted anesthesia personnel can return to their profession even after substantial treatment. Id.
(citing Eric. B. Hedberg, Anesthesiologists: Addicted to the Drugs They Administer, AM. Soc.
ANESTHESIOLOGIST NEWSLETTER, May 2001). This is very different from James v. Kansas City Chiefs
Football Club, 2005 WL 1532945, at *12 (W.D. Mo. June 28, 2005), where the plaintiffs risk of
relapse of pancreatitis did not amount to a current disability because he was "fully functional between
acute attacks," and that "working or not working would not in any way aggravate" his condition.
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is prohibitively impairing for many recovering drug addicts, this risk
itself is a symptom of the underlying disease. An insurance company's
definition of drug addiction as being characterized merely by active use
therefore has no merit, especially considering that the DSM-IV
expressly notes that relapse is part of the disability itself.'7 8 Indeed, the
risk of relapse is not merely a hypothetical one; it is prevalent, and it is
ever-present.179 The plaintiffs in Colby and Stanfordare living evidence
that the risk is real and is very much intertwined with the drug
dependence itself.180 Thus, to provide coverage for the addiction itself,
but not the risk of relapse into addiction, runs counter to the true nature
of the illness.
This is not to say that all former drug addicts should receive LTD
benefits for the rest of their lives. This would be an undue burden on the
insurance companies, and it would not be right to indefinitely provide
benefits to addicts who are fully recovered and have only a minimal risk
of relapse. Regarding these concerns, the answer seems simple: listen to
the doctors. Insurance companies and courts are not trained in
medicine, so they should not be in the habit of overruling a doctor's
opinions. If a doctor concludes that an employee's risk of relapse is so
severe as to constitute a current disability, any contrary claims that the
risk of relapse is a future, rather than a current, impediment should be
unavailing. Whether the risk of relapse of an addiction should be
covered should turn on the severity of that risk. Inevitably then, these
cases should amount to little more than the facts of each case and most
importantly, a medical professional's assessment of the likelihood of
relapse. Thus, the probability of a future relapse should drive the
178. According to the DSM-IV, opioid dependence, or "addiction" as it is more generally and
commonly known, is a chronic illness characterized by periods of active use (relapses) and periods of
remission, where the probability of relapsing back into active use may remain high. See AMERICAN
PSYCHIATRIC ASSOCIATION, DIAGNOSTIC AND STATISTICAL MANUAL OF MENTAL DISORDERS: DSMIV 175-273 (Washington D.C., 1994).
179. Relapse rates for addictive diseases are usually in the range of 50% to 90%. Caron
Treatment Centers, Relapse & Recovery: Behavioral Strategiesfor Change (2003). Addiction is a
chronic illness because the risk of relapse is ever-present, which requires long-term follow-up care for
the addict. Royal Maccabees Life Ins. Co., 2001 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 20563, at * 17 (N.D. Ill. Sept. 20,
2001) (citing J. Reggers & M. Annsseau, Guidelinesfor the Treatment of OpiateAddiction, 55 (5) REv.
MED. LIEGE 409-416 (May 2000); Sanz Yaguez & Lopez Corbalan, Abuse of Psychoactive Drugs
Among Health Professionals,46 (8) REV. Esp. ANESTESIOL REANIM 354-58 (Oct. 1999)).
180. For example, Colby relapsed twice and Stanford relapsed three times. Relapse itself does not
amount to a treatment failure, as many believe: "The chronic nature of the disease means that relapsing
to drug abuse is not only possible, but likely. Relapse rates . . . for drug addiction are similar to those
for other well-characterized chronic medical illnesses such as diabetes, hypertension, and asthma, which
also have both physiological and behavioral components. Treatment of chronic diseases involves
changing deeply imbedded behaviors, and relapse does not mean treatment failure." Drugs, Brains,and
ABUSE,
ON DRUG
INSTITUTE
Behavior: The Science of Addiction, NATIONAL
http://www.drugabuse.gov/publications/drugs-brains-behavior-science-addiction/treatment-recovery
(last visited Jan. 8, 2014).
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outcome of these cases. Perhaps then Colby and Stanford can be
reconciled; after all, there was far more medical evidence presented
suggesting Dr. Colby's high risk of relapse' 8 ' than there was for Robert
Stanford. 2 By no means then should every former addict continue to
receive LTD benefits; not every case will have facts as extreme as those
presented in Colby and Stanford, where the former opiate addicts were
actually working with those opiates on a daily basis.
IV. CONCLUSION

The question of whether the risk of relapse can amount to a current
disability is not an easy one; to be sure, there are strong policy
arguments against providing benefits to current or former drug addicts.
After all, there is some substance to the argument that addiction at least
begins with a voluntary choice (and in many of these cases, a voluntary
choice to illegally use drugs). 83 A doctor who is unable to work
because she is battling the unlawful abuse of opiates is not as innocent
as a doctor who gets into a car crash and is physically incapable of
performing surgeries. And it would seem that providing coverage for
the risk of relapse could be easily manipulated. For instance, how
would we measure who is at risk for relapse? Does every former addict
have the same risk of relapse? If not, what is stopping recovering
addicts from falsely telling their doctors that their desire to re-abuse
drugs is stronger than it actually is?
While not completely without merit, these concerns overlook some of
the facts. First, while the initial use of drugs is many times the product
of a voluntary choice, numerous illnesses are influenced, if not caused,
by voluntary choices as well.184 Thus, singling out addiction for
unfavorable treatment seems driven more by moral opprobrium and
false assumptions than it does medical science. Second, and this point
bears emphasizing, the plans at issue in Colby and Stanford explicitly
provided LTD benefits for drug addiction. In other words, the
employers in those cases felt that substance abuse was no different than
the myriad other forms of illnesses that were being covered under the
plans. The "voluntary choice" argument about drug abuse is thus
nonsensical; why would the plans have included benefits for such a
181. Colby, 705 F.3d at 63-64.
182. Stanford, 514 F.3d at 356. Similarly, in both James v. Kansas City Chiefs Football Club,
2005 WL 1532945, at *6-7 (where the plaintiffs doctor said that he could return) and Allen v. Minn.
Life Ins. Co., 216 F. Supp. 2d 1377, 1380 (N.D. Ga. 2001) (where the doctor said that the plaintiff had
no limitation of functional capacity, was able to function under stress, and was expected to improve), the
relatively small risk of relapse factored into the courts' denials of coverage for that risk.
183. As discussed supra Part HI.C.1.
184. See Starr,supra note 166.

Published by University of Cincinnati College of Law Scholarship and Publications, 2018

25

University of Cincinnati Law Review, Vol. 82, Iss. 3 [2018], Art. 7

952

UNIVERSITY OF CINCINNATI LAW REVIEW

[VOL. 82

disease in the first place if it was truly brought on by purely voluntary
means? Focusing an analysis on this "voluntary choice" argument is
distracting; it frames the issue as whether or not the addiction itself is
covered while obfuscating the real question: whether, given that the
underlying addiction is covered under the plan, the risk of relapse into
Finally, regarding any concerns
that addiction is similarly covered.
that a former addict could merely claim that he has a grave risk of
relapsing, the easy solution to this would be to merely listen to the
doctors' opinions. The decision to provide, or not provide, coverage for
the risk of relapse of an addiction should turn on the severity of that risk,
the severity of which is unarguably a medical determination.
Ultimately the Colby ruling is unlikely to impact how benefit plans
are drafted in the future. Drug addiction is an illness and is recognized
as such by medical professionals. Coverage for such addiction in the
benefit plans in Colby and Stanford is therefore not surprising; instead, it
reflects the growing recognition of substance abuse as a disease. In
many cases, the risk of relapse is part of that disease. Several medical
professionals averred that Dr. Colby suffered a high risk of relapse into
her opiate addiction and thus was currently disabled and incapable of
returning to her occupation as an anesthesiologist. Her insurance
company's denial of benefits for such risk was rightly overturned by the
First Circuit. Future cases should simply be driven by a medical
professional's assessment of the employee's risk of relapse. In so doing,
all other arguments regarding the lack of explicit coverage in the benefit
plans for such risk or the voluntariness of drug abuse should be rendered
moot; after all, if a doctor concludes that a risk is so severe that it
constitutes a current disability, it will necessarily satisfy the
requirements of the plan and will thus warrant coverage under it.

185. Plus, the "voluntary choice" argument in the addiction context is a misguided assumption
about the nature of addiction, as discussed supra Part III.C.
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